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PERMISSIVE INFERENCE FROM THE
NONPRODUCTION OF EQUALLY
AVAILABLE WITNESSES
In United States v. Dibrizzi1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when a witness is equally
available to both parties, nonproduction of the witness allows the
jury to draw an inference that the testimony would have been un-
favorable to either party. 2 The defendant in Dibrizzi was con-
victed of embezzling union funds. When the prosecutor com-
mented on the failure of defendant to call a key witness an objection
was taken. The defendant contended that the uncalled witness was
equally available to either party and thus his nonproduction should
not be cause for an inference against the defendant. The court
acknowledged that defendant's contentions had some support, but
felt the better rule is that the failure to call an equally available
witness is open to an inference against either party. There is a
substantial split of authority concerning the permissibility of this
inference in civil and criminal actions of which Dibrizzi is a recent
illustration. This Comment will consider whether the inference
should be allowed. It will also discuss the problems involved in
defining equal availability, the reasoning behind the decisions
which allow or deny the inference, the procedural effect of such an
inference, and propose, in conclusion, a resolution of the split of
authority.
GENERAL LAW OF INFERENCES AND PRESUMPTIONS
A short review of the general law of inferences and presump-
tions will help put the precise issue in perspective. The rules of
evidence determine what should and should not be heard by the
jury. These rules recognize that principles of probability provide
the groundwork for the submission of presumptions and infer-
ences to the jury. When it is extremely probable that fact B will
follow fact A then the jury is allowed to consider the presumption
or inference that it does.8 Support for allowing presumptions and
1. 393 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. Id. at 646. The inference requested is usually phrased in terms of
unfavorable testimony. Sometimes it is called a presumption and the
exact wording often differs.
3. C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 309 (1954). Presumptions are of two
kinds: permissive and mandatory. These terms are descriptive of the
effect that the presumption has on the jury. Mandatory presumptions
inferences to go to the jury is also found in considerations of con-
venience, fairness in allocating the burden of proof, and social and
economic policy.4 Wide latitude is allowed counsel when arguing
these inferences to the jury.5
A relevant example of an inference is the negative inference
based on nonproduction of evidence and witnesses. The inference
goes back to 1722 and Armory v. Delamirie.6 There the court would
presume the worst against the nonproducer of important evidence.
Lord Mansfield's statement that all the evidence is to be weighed
according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to
produce and the other to contradict,7 has become a maxim. The
assumption that a party does not produce evidence because he fears
to do so leads to the presumption that witnesses not produced
would give testimony harmful to the nonproducer. Thus the
"missing witness rule" provides that if a party has it peculiarly
within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would
elucidate the transaction, nonproduction of such witnesses creates
the presumption that their testimony would be unfavorable.8
The key to the missing witness rule is in the phrase "peculiarly
within his power." The inference is not drawn because of mere
nonproduction, but is based on nonproduction when all the facts
point to favorable testimony from the uncalled witness.9
Since all the facts point toward favorable testimony from the
uncalled witness, the courts seek to infer some reason for non-
production. The presumption is that the witness was not pro-
duced because, in fact, his testimony would have been unfavorable.
There are, therefore, several exceptions to the missing witness rule.
Where the witness is equally unavailable to the parties there can
be no inference drawn from nor any comment made upon his non-
production.10 Similarly, in the case of corroborative testimony or
that which is cumulative or unimportant, the missing witness rule
is inapplicable. 1
compel the jury to find in accordance with the established probabilities
(i.e., that a properly addressed and stamped letter shows receipt by the
addressee). Permissive presumptions allow the jury to weigh the inference
provided by the facts. It is the latter group which this Comment will
discuss.
4. 2 J. WirMORE, EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
5. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. DeFillo, 257 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
915; United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 912; see United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 666.
6. 1 Strange 505 (1722).
7. Blatch v. Archer, Cowp. 66 (1774).
8. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); Pennewell v. United
States, 353 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556
(D.C. Cir. 1940); State v. Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1965).
9. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
10. United States v. Bergman, 354 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1966).
11. State v. Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1965); State v. Clawans, 38
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In Dibrizzi, the uncalled witnesses were equally available to
both parties to the action. In many cases it is said that where
the witness is equally available no inference may be drawn from
his nonproduction. 12 The more logical view is that nonproduction
is open to an inference against either party.1" Before turning to a
N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77 (1962); see United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800
(3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Llamas, 280 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1960); State v.
Parker, 151 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1967); State v. Frazier, 221 A.2d 468 (R.I.
1966).
Some jurisdictions equate nonproduction with wilful suppression; the
cases clearly are not synonymous and wilful suppression will not be
considered. People v. Hrisoulas, 251 Cal. App. 2d 791, 60 Cal. Rptr. 80
(1967); People v. Lopez, 169 Cal. App. 2d 4, 336 P.2d 614 (1959); State v.
Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960).
See generally Evidence: Positive and Negative Inferences From
Spoilation or Suppression of Evidence or Witnesses, 17 OKLA. L. REV.
74 (1964).
12. Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1967); Pennewell v. United States,
353 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th
Cir. 1962); Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961); Wagner
v. United States, 264 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1959); Shurman v. United States,
233 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1956); Zammar v. United States, 217 F.2d 223 (8th
Cir. 1954); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Himmel-
farb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949); Rostello v. United States,
36 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1929); Orr v. State, 269 Ala. 696, 111 So. 2d 627 (1958);
Kissic v. State, 266 Ala. 71, 94 So. 2d 202 (1957); Bates v. Morris, 101 Ala.
34, 13 So. 138 (1893); State v. Segar, 96 Conn. 428, 114 A. 389 (1921); Sco-
Vill v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316 (1858); Blackman v. State, 78 Ga. 592, 3 S.E.
418 (1887); People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (1917); People v.
Smith, 74 Ill. App. 2d 458, 221 N.E.2d 68 (1966); Barringer v. Arnold, 358
Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960); see United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d
653 (2d Cir. 1965); State v. Plourde, 3 Conn. Cir. 465, 217 A.2d 423 (1965);
People v. Williams, 87 Ill. App. 2d 338, 231 N.E.2d 646 (1967); People v.
Williamson, 78 Ill. App. 2d 90, 223 N.E.2d 453 (1966); cf., McClannahan v.
United States, 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); The
Oregon, 133 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1904); Denton v. State, 246 Ind. 155, 203
N.E.2d 539 (1965). See also the multitude of citations in 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
13. United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666;
Burch v. Reading Co., 140 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 574
(2d Cir. 1956); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Bearden, 114
Ga. App. 392, 151 S.E.2d 517 (1966); Denies v. First National Life Insurance
Co., 44 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1962); Baker v. Salvation Army, 91 N.H. 1, 12
A.2d 514 (1940); see Delaware and Hudson Co. v. Nahas, 14 F.2d 56 (3d
Cir. 1926); Western and A. R. Co. v. Morrison, 102 Ga. 319, 29 S.E. 104
(1897); Goodloe v. State, 229 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. 1967); State v. Gardin, 251
Minn. 110, 86 N.W.2d 711 (1957); State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77
(1962); Commonwealth v. Black, 186 Pa. Super. 223, 142 A.2d 495 (1958);
Commonwealth v. Trignaini, 185 Pa. Super. 332, 138 A.2d 215 (1958); Woo-
ten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958); cf. United States v. Beek-
man, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); People v. McElroy, 30 Ill. 2d 286, 196
N.E.2d 651 (1964); State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922). See also
J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
discussion of this split of authority, an inspection of who is an
equally available witness is necessary.
EQUALLY AVAILABLE WITNESS
A perusal of the cases does not yield a single workable stand-
ard by which "equal availability" of a witness may be judged.
There are two theories diametrically opposed in concept and appli-
cation. One considers equal availability in the narrow sense of mere
physical presence.14 The other looks to relationships and expec-
tations of testimony in making the determination.1" By the narrow
definition of some jurisdictions all persons who are physically pres-
ent at trial or accessible to service of process are equally available
to either party. Thus, police officers, conspirators now in prison,
and relatives of a party to the action may all be witnesses equally
available to both parties, depending on their physical location.
For example, a leading case in Alabama held that where the
husband of one of the parties was in court he was equally accessible
to both parties. 6 A more recent federal case held defendant's
partners in a criminal enterprise who were imprisoned for that
crime were witnesses equally available to either party at defendant's
trial.1'7 Indicative of the same reasoning are cases which hold
police officers to be equally available.'
8
On the other hand, many courts have shown a willingness to
use a broader definition of equal availability which takes into ac-
count factors other than physical presence. This viewpoint is
expressed in McClannahan v. United States,19 where the uncalled
witness was defendant's attorney and was therefore held not to be
equally available. The court in dictum said that the question of
equal availability is largely one of fact, with a wide variety of cir-
cumstances bearing on its ultimate determination. It is not decided
merely from a witness' physical presence or accessibility to sub-
poena. On the contrary, it may depend on his relationship to one
14. See Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966); Arellanes v. United States,
302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th
Cir. 1961); Bates v. Morris, 101 Ala. 34, 13 So. 138 (1893); Bell v. State, 243
Ark. 839, 422 S.W.2d 668 (1968); State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139
(1922); State v. Gardin, 251 Minn. 110, 86 N.W.2d 711 (1957); State v.
Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1965); Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314
S.W.2d 1 (1958).
15. McClannahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 824; Orr v. State, 40 Ala. App. 45, 111 So. 2d 627 (1958);
Grady v. Collins Transportation Co., 341 Mass. 502, 170 N.E.2d 725 (1960).
This is the view of equal availability held by Wigmore.
16. Bates v. Morris, 101 Ala. 34, 13 So. 138 (1893).
17. Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961).
18. E.g., Bell v. State, 243 Ark. 839, 422 S.W.2d 668 (1968); State v.
Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1965); Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314
S.W.2d 1 (1958).
19. 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
party and the nature of the testimony he might be expected to
give. This definition results in fewer witnesses being equally
available. This viewpoint considers certain realities of testimony
and seems to weigh more carefully the probabilities on which all
inferences are based. The definition which was first considered
holding relatives, co-defendants, and police officers equally avail-
able seems unrealistic and places undue faith in the presumption
of the honesty of a witness. Definitional problems, however, are
not the major concern. The permissibility of an inference under
any definition is the important problem which divides the courts.
THE PERMISSIBILITY OF AN INFERENCE;
20
THE No INFERENCE POSITION
It would appear that the reasons given for permitting an infer-
ence to be drawn when a witness is equally available are stronger
than those given for not permitting an inference.
One reason cited to uphold the no inference position is that
the "logical corollary" to the missing witness rule is that no pre-
sumption should arise when the witness is equally available.21 On
closer observation, however, it will be noted that this is not the
logical corollary to the rule. Where a witness is equally available
20. To properly analyze the problem it must be assumed that there
is an equally available witness and a civil action. The vital differences
between civil and criminal procedure raise a question regarding the pro-
priety of permitting an inference from nonproduction of an equally avail-
able witness against defendants in criminal trials. Generally, whatever rule
regarding the permissibility of an inference is chosen, it is followed in
both the civil and criminal courts. This blanket application, however, ig-
nores the fact that the rights of the criminal defendant differ greatly from
those of the civil defendant. "It is at least doubtful, that as between a
defendant in a criminal case, presumed to be innocent and required to call
no witness, and the people, who have the burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, the rule of equal availability of witnesses to the commission of
a crime has any sensible application." People v. Moore, 17 A.D.2d 57,
230 N.Y.S.2d 880, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 838 (1962).
This excerpt highlights the problems with the inference in a criminal
trial. Should an inference be permissible against a party who is presumed
to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? Should
an inference be permissible against a party who has the option of silence,
who needs present no case at all? These questions are rhetorical. Keep-
ing in mind that it is the duty of the prosecutor to see that justice is done
not to obtain every conviction possible, it is this writer's opinion that as a
matter of law no inference should be permissible against the defendant in
a criminal case.
Because some points to be later discussed are best illustrated by
criminal cases, such citations will be found throughout this Comment.
21. Pennewell v. United States, 353 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1965) citing
Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
he is within the control of both parties. According to the missing
witness rule this would lead to an inference against either party,
not to no inference at all. The so-called corollary is defective
logically because it tries to state a rule as the reason for that
rule.
Another reason supporting the no inference rule, and perhaps
the one which carries the most weight, is the contention that any
inference would be mere speculation.22 The jury is to try the case
on the facts. They should not attempt to guess at what might be
shown. In the case of nonproduction of a witness the jury has no
right to guess as to what might be said.23  But as described in
United States v. Cotter,24 when both sides fail to call a witness
who knows something of the facts, their conduct is a circumstance
which the jury should use. If both can call the witness and he is
impartial his testimony will have little weight. If it appears he
would naturally side with one party it is reasonable to expect
that he is not being used for good reason. This is a fair argument
for the opposition. An inference, strictly speaking, is proper against
each side but of different weight. These considerations, however,
cannot completely outweigh the argument that the jury will be
guessing if it applies the inference. To the extent that the laws
of probability do not operate to alleviate the absence of testimony
this is a valid argument for the no interference position.
A third argument supporting the no inference position is that
there is no duty to call every witness. If in view of some trial
strategy, the interest of time, or fear of prejudicing the case or
introducing error, one party fails to call an equally available wit-
ness, the jury should not be allowed to infer that the reason for
nonproduction is the fear of adverse testimony. The argument was
well put in Morton v. United States:25  "It is necessary in the
prosecution of a case that evidence and witnesses be sifted and
selected with a view to economy of trial time and a better under-
standing of the case by the jury. '2 6 Under this view since there
is no duty to call all the witnesses, failure to do so does not imply
a design to suppress the truth.27  But, while there is no duty to
call all the witnesses, there is a duty to obtain all pertinent infor-
mation. If counsel is keeping a close eye on trial time and is de-
sirous of having the jury understand his presentation he should cut
out redundant and repetitive witnesses. Clearly, the cumulative,
22. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Scovill v.
Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316 (1858).
23. Bates v. Morris, 101 Ala. 34, 13 So. 138 (1893).
24. 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666.
25. 147 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
26. See also Zammar v. United States, 217 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1954);
Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 951 (9th Cir. 1949); Barringer v.
Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960); cf., People v. McElroy, 30
Ill. 2d 286, 196 N.E.2d 651 (1964).
27. Bleecker v. Johnston, 69 N.Y. 309 (1877).
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corroborative, irrelevant exception, which allows no inference when
a nonproduced witness fits one of these categories, 8 is designed
to provide counsel with the necessary latitude to plan his case
uninfluenced by a negative inference. Where a witness' testi-
mony does not fall under one of these exceptions there ought to
be the risk that a negative inference will result from his nonpro-
duction.
Another reason for not allowing an inference is the fear that
the party will be prejudiced because the jury might associate non-
production with wilful suppression.2 9 This problem arises when
at the close of both cases one counsel moves for the inference
from nonproduction and the other is surprised and unable to pro-
vide the needed explanation. If the trial passes this critical stage
without prejudice, instructions to the jury may be made excluding
the consideration of fraud and wilful suppression. New Jersey case
law30 has developed an effective system to achieve this desired
goal by having the motion made out of the hearing of the jury.3'
The problem of prejudicing a jury with intimations of fraud does
not exist merely because an inference is allowed, and under the
system which will be proposed below the problem does not exist.
Another fear of the proponents of the no inference rule is that
an attorney may be able to cast an unfavorable light on an oppo-
nent's case by his own inactivity. Thus, where a witness is equally
available, the party calling for the inference may himself be
guilty of nonproduction; the concern is that in the eleventh hour
of the trial, a negative inference will be asked for by a party who
has slept on his equal ability to produce the witness.3 2 The answer
to this contention is twofold. First, the party asking the inference
is perfectly willing to risk the inference against himself in order to
argue that it would be more logically drawn against the opposition.
Second, even though witnesses are called equally available, never-
theless, they are generally bound by logic, burden of proof, or
natural relationship to one party's case.33 A permissive inference
28. See the discussion of exceptions to the missing witness rule on
p. 388 supra, and cases cited in footnote 11.
29. Cf., Barringer v. Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960);
Western and A. R. Co. v. Morrison, 102 Ga. 319, 29 S.E. 104, 107 (1897)
(dissenting opinion).
30. State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77 (1962).
31. The precise procedure and the actual effect of the inference will
be discussed in a later portion of this Comment.
32. Shurman v. United States, 233 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1956); cf., United
States v. Simons, 374 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1025
(1967); United States v. Llamas, 280 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1960).
33. Western and A.R. Co. v. Morrison, 102 Ga. 319, 29 S.E. 104 (1897).
recognizes these facts; they should not be negated by an arbitrary
declaration of no inference.
Perhaps the most easily refuted of the reasons given in the cause
of no inference is expressed in State v. Segar.34 The court felt
that since the opponent wishes to argue that the testimony would
be unfavorable if produced, the opponent should put the witness
on the stand. The argument for an inference cuts both ways
and therefore no inference should be allowed." The response to
this assertion is to allow an inference against either party. If the
argument tells just as much against both parties, let the inference
be argued to the jury hoping that someone will produce the wit-
ness. In that way, even if the witness is not called the jury knows
the circumstances surrounding his nonproduction, has heard the
arguments of counsel, and is able to assign some weight to the non-
production. If facts may be reached by the threat of an adverse
inference, then let it be drawn; if the inference is unjustified it may
be avoided by explanation. 6
One final reason stated by those who expound the no inference
position is that reluctance of people to testify may be the true
cause of nonproduction. 37 But if a negative inference encourages
counsel to put reluctant but valuable witnesses on the stand then
it would be an important tool for the legal profession. The rules
of evidence are designed to place the facts before the jury, not to
hide them. The time-honored theory of the trial as a strict adver-
sary proceeding is no longer regarded as the most valid procedural
method.38  Primarily concerned with airing all possible evi-
dence, the courts should employ every legal tool to do so. If coun-
sel can be induced to produce important witnesses by the threat of
a negative inference from nonproduction, then the inference should
be allowed. Contrary to what some courts have held, allowing
the inference will not instill our system with guesswork, but will
provide for the efficient balancing of the probabilities by the jury
when it makes a decision.
THE INFERENCE PERMITTED POSITION
Although many of the courts allowing an inference provide no
reasoning for their position, 39 the theory most heavily relied upon
34. 96 Conn. 428, 114 A. 339 (1921).
35. Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961).
36. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 280 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
37. 78 Ill. App. 2d 90, 223 N.E.2d 453 (1966).
38. The Field Code in New York pioneered this thinking which has
culminated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide wide dis-
covery techniques and simplified pleading forms.
39. E.g., United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946).
"It is sometimes said that no inference can be drawn against a party for
failure to call a witness equally available to both parties .... We agree
with Wigmore's criticism of that rule." State v. Gardin, 251 Minn. 110, 86




Presumptively, all persons will tell the truth when sworn
to do so, but we know from experience that it is frequently
unwise to call as a witness one who is likely to be biased
or prejudiced in favor of the opposite side. . . . Theo-
retically one party may be under as much obligation as
the other to introduce a witness who was present at a
transaction or occurrence in dispute and failure to do so
may be said to cut as hard against one as the other, or that
it should not cut against either when the witness is in court
ready to be examined; but despite of all the reasoning and
refining which may be had on the subject and notwith-
standing intimations and expressions to the contrary by
learned judges, the great fact remains a large number of
witnesses are, for various reasons, more or less biased and it
certainly is true that a party may with more safety intro-
duce a friendly witness than one who is otherwise . . . be-
cause, as everybody knows, there is much in the manner in
which a witness testifies, a great deal often depending
upon his emphasis, upon the clearness or uncertainty of
his recollection, upon his animus and upon one hundred
other things which cannot well be described but can readily
be imagined, all of which, . . . affect and qualify the force
of what he says.
40
More recently, it was said that the reasons for nonproduction of
evidence are so many and so varied that there can be no positive
rule of law refusing the inference.4 ' It has also been said that
since an equally available witness may be extremely favorable to
one party and even hostile to the other, it is a fair inference that
the party to whom the witness was favorable omitted to call him
because the testimony would not support his contentions. 42 The
only way certain factors can be considered is to allow the jury the
benefit of counsel's argument and permit them to draw an infer-
ence; otherwise, a rule permitting no inference would reduce to
arbitrary uniformity that which perhaps depends on the facts of
each case.
48
Another reason cited for allowing the inference is that counsel
are given wide latitude in arguing their case before the jury.44 The
sessing peculiar knowledge of the facts of the case, a presumption arises
that . . . his testimony would have been unfavorable to such party."
Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1958). "The rule is that it
[nonproduction] may give rise to such a presumption or infernece."
40. Western and A. R. Co. v. Morrison, 102 Ga. 319, 29 S.E. 104 (1897).
41. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Nahas, 14 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1926) (where
the court felt that this was better left to the discretion of the trial court).
42. Stevens v. Moore, 139 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. App. 1940).
43. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1964 Supp.).
44. See cases cited note 5 supra.
dissenting opinion in Graves v. United States45 after stating the
wide latitude principle argues that although facts not proved can-
not be discussed, illogical conclusions from facts proved may be in-
sisted upon.46 If such wide latitude is allowed that illogical argu-
ments may be made to the jury, certainly it is no less improper to
allow arguments concerning an inference based on probability and
the applicability of the inference to leave to the jury. To allow no
inference as a matter of law wherever there is no absolute certainty
would reduce our trials to dry factual presentations and our trial
counsel to mere investigatory machinery. Wide argument allows
everything to be placed before the jury; if the witness is impartial
it will have little effect.
4 7
A third reason to allow the inference is found in the basic
rules of evidence. Every fact which legally comes to the knowledge
of the jury and which may influence their decisions is subject for
comment. 48 When both sides fail to call a knowledgeable witness,
their conduct, as with everything else they do, is a circumstance
which the jury may use.49 To deny counsel the right to comment
vigorously to the jury on nonproduction denies his client a very
substantial right.50
Another strong argument arises from the concept of the bur-
den of proof. Where a witness has knowledge of facts pertinent to
a certain issue and the party with the burden of proof on that issue
fails to produce the witness, a negative inference is logical. 51 In
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bearden,12 the inference was
allowed where the burden of proving payment was on the defend-
ant and the court felt that the testimony of the absent witnesses
would tend to prove the claim had been paid. Thus it was incum-
bent upon defendant to produce such testimony or account for its
absence. Although the witness was equally available, had the
plaintiff thought the witness would tend to prove payment, his
counsel's duty would have been to avoid the witness and argue the
inference. As indicated earlier the inference is proper against both
but of different weight. Clearly it should weigh heavily on the
party with the burden of proof.
Allowing a permissive inference provides the law with a useful
malleability. The inference fits any fact situation which provides a
reason for the inference by its own unique qualities. In Goodloe
45. 150 U.S. 118, 122 (1893).
46. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 666 (1932).
47. Id.
48. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
49. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 666 (1932).
50. United States v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1958).
51. See Denies v. First National Insurance Co., 144 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. 1962).
52. 114 Ga. App. 392, 151 S.E.2d 517 (1966).
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v. State,58 the affidavit charging the defendant listed eight wit-
nesses and only three were used. One was in court but uncalled
and when the prosecutor was asked about his testimony he re-
plied: "[t]hen you will have to make him your witness as I
do not prefer to call him." The court allowed the inference to be
drawn because the statement by the prosecutor had added to the
probability that the witness would have been unfavorable to the
state.
Another consideration supporting the permissible inference
position is that the absolute rule of no inference ignores the fact
that some witnesses are more logically part of one party's case.
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Since that party has a higher duty to call the witness 5 it is impor-
tant to allow the jury to assign some value to this nonproduction.
A party should not be forced to present the opposition's case in
order to obtain all the facts.
Therefore, in view of the general evidentiary policy of admit-
ting anything that would help the jury and excluding only those
things prohibited by strong policy considerations, it is submitted
that the inference from nonproduction of a witnesss should be
permissible.
PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF ALLOWING AN INFERENCE
It is clear that there is much to be gained by allowing the jury
a permissive inference against either party in the case of nonpro-
duction of equally available witnesses.50 What then is the pro-
cedural effect of allowing an inference. The procedural problem
posed by permitting the inference is that the jury may suspect
fraud or infer bad faith from the nonproduction.57 This is to be
scrupulously avoided and State v. Clawans58 provides the method
for avoiding this problem. A conversation important to that case
allegedly took place with a witness nearby. The witness, however,
was not called to testify to the content of the conversation. De-
fendant requested a charge that from nonproduction of the wit-
ness the jury may infer that no such conversation took place. The
court recognized that the requested charge was too broad; never-
53. 229 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. 1967).
54. See State v. Parker, 151 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1967) (dissenting
opinion).
55. See State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922).
56. At this point the discussion in note 20 concerning the applicability
of the inference to a criminal defendant is reemphasized,
57. See discussion on p. 343 supra.
58. State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77 (1962).
theless, it said that the failure of a party to produce elucidating
testimony raises the natural inference that such party fears to pro-
duce because the testimony would have been unfavorable. Such
inference is always open to destruction by explanation. The court,
in holding that it is more logical to allow the inference also stated
the cumulative, corroborative, and unimportant exception to the
rule. Most important, however, was the court's recognition that the
application of these principles is particularly perplexing when a
litigant requests a charge concerning them. If presented at the
close of the entire case the defaulting litigant is surprised and not
prepared to offer the needed explanation. The better practice
would be for the party requesting a charge to so advise the judge
at the close of opposition's case out of the hearing of the jury. The
judge may then determine if any reference in summation is war-
ranted.5 9 If it is warranted then the trier of fact takes over and
must first decide that the witness would have information relevant
to the issue being tried.6 0 The inference must then be applied, but
only with caution,0 1 and only if there is a reason for such inference
and a factual area in which it may logically operate. To be applied
the supposition must rise above the level of mere possibility. 2
When the inference is applied, it will not corroborate adverse
testimony. 68 It will not supply a deficiency in the other party's
case64 nor will it be regarded as proof of any essential fact.6 5
Rather it is persuasive evidence for the jury to consider in the
light of the rest of the facts. It will not outweigh sworn evidence
accepted as credible by the trier of fact,66 but it will provide the
jury with another yardstick to measure the evidence and decide
the facts.
SUMMARY
In this Comment the split of authority concerning the permis-
sibility of an adverse inference from the nonproduction of an
equally available witness has been demonstrated. The reasons
given by the courts which do not allow such an inference have been
discussed and discredited, or in the case of procedural difficulties,
obviated. The reasons cited by the courts in favor of allowing the
inference were shown to be more persuasive because they consider
both the realities of trial practice and the overriding aims of evi-
dentiary policy.
59. Id. at 167, 183 A.2d 82.
60. United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1967).
61. See Wilson v. United States, 352 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1965); Grady
v. Collins Transportation Co., 341 Mass. 502, 170 N.E.2d 725 (1960).
62. Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1964).
63. See Vogt v. S. M. Byrne Construction Co., 17 Wis. 2d 96, 117
N.W.2d 362 (1962).
64. Laffin v. Ryan, 4 A.D. 2d 21, 162 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1957).
65. Id.




Although there is some danger of procedural prejudice in-
herent in allowing the inference, the New Jersey courts have cir-
cumvented that danger by having the request for a charge regard-
ing the inference made out of the hearing of the jury and in time
to allow the other party to offer an explanation for nonproduction.
The judge may then rule with respect to comment by the attorneys
during summation and prepare a charge to the jury concerning the
inference if any is warranted.
WALTER G. REINARD
